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#### Explanatory notes

The following symbols are used in tables in this publication:

Three dots (...) indicate that data are not available or are not separately reported.

A minus sign (-) indicates a deficit or decrease, unless otherwise indicated.

A full stop (.) is used to indicate decimals.

Use of a hyphen (-) between years (e.g., 2001-2003) indicates reference to the complete period considered, including the beginning and end years.

The term "dollars" refers to United States dollars, unless otherwise specified.

Figures and percentages in tables may not necessarily add up to the corresponding totals due to rounding.



# **Contents**

Fore	wor	<u>.</u>	11
Chap	oter	I	
Crisi	s, p	ost-crisis, new era: between the limits of development and	
the d	leve	lopment we intended	15
A.	Th	e crisis: outbreak and outlook	15
	1.	Gauging the impact of the crisis	16
	2.	How the crisis caught up with Latin America and the Caribbean	19
	3.	Constraints and opportunities on the new international scene	23
	4.	The need for a new multilateral global architecture	29
	5.	The challenges of planetary climate security	32
B.	Th	e value of equality for the future	38
	1.	Taking the best of modern politics	38
	2.	Why now is the time for an equality agenda	40
	3.	Different but equal	42
	4.	The interaction of unmet needs	43
C.	Th	e issues before us	44
Chap	oter	II	
Mac	roec	onomic policy for development: moving on from lessons learned	
and	char	ting a new course	47
A.	Int	roduction	47
B.	Ac	hievements and shortcomings of macroeconomic reforms since the 1990s	49
	1.	Achievements	49
	2.	Shortcomings from the development perspective	51
C.	Са		
D.	Eff	ects on growth and equity	61
E.	Th	e challenges of a macroeconomy for development	66

	1. Countercyclical fiscal policy	67
	2. Monetary policy	69
	3. Exchange-rate policy, productive development and sustainable stability	
	4. Capital market reform	
Char	oter III	
-	ctural heterogeneity and productivity gaps: from fragmentation to convergence	85
A.	Introduction	
В.	Heterogeneity among sectors and agents: external and internal convergence	
D.	<ol> <li>Production structure and productivity dispersion</li> </ol>	
	<ol> <li>Productivity gaps and employment</li></ol>	
	<ol> <li>Heterogeneity among agents: employment, wages and performance</li> </ol>	
C.	Heterogeneity in the manufacturing sector: variations in the productivity	)1
С.	gap and specialization	97
D.	Productivity gap and energy gap	
Е.	Difficult choices	
F.	Incentive schemes and production policies	
	<ol> <li>Macroeconomic structures and development policies</li> </ol>	
	<ol> <li>Microeconomic market incentives</li></ol>	
	3. Industrial policy	
	4. Technology policy	
	5. SME-support policies	
	6. Towards an integrated agenda for production development	
-	oter IV	100
A.	e does matter: territorial disparities and convergence Introduction	
A	Introduction	1/3
В.	The territorial dimension of inequality	124
	The territorial dimension of inequality 1. Territorial heterogeneity in Latin America	124 124
В.	<ol> <li>The territorial dimension of inequality</li> <li>Territorial heterogeneity in Latin America</li> <li>Economic territorial disparities in Latin America</li> </ol>	124 124 127
	<ul><li>The territorial dimension of inequality</li><li>1. Territorial heterogeneity in Latin America</li><li>2. Economic territorial disparities in Latin America</li><li>Hardship and segregation: regional and urban maps</li></ul>	124 124 127 130
В.	<ul> <li>The territorial dimension of inequality</li> <li>1. Territorial heterogeneity in Latin America</li> <li>2. Economic territorial disparities in Latin America</li> <li>Hardship and segregation: regional and urban maps</li> <li>1. The map of hardship in Latin America</li> </ul>	124 124 127 130 130
В. С.	<ol> <li>The territorial dimension of inequality</li></ol>	124 124 127 130 130 134
В.	<ul> <li>The territorial dimension of inequality</li></ul>	124 124 127 130 130 134 140
В. С.	<ul> <li>The territorial dimension of inequality</li></ul>	124 124 127 130 130 134 140 140
В. С.	<ul> <li>The territorial dimension of inequality</li></ul>	124 124 127 130 130 134 140 142
В. С.	<ul> <li>The territorial dimension of inequality</li></ul>	124 124 127 130 130 134 140 142 146
В. С.	<ul> <li>The territorial dimension of inequality</li></ul>	124 124 127 130 130 134 140 142 142
В. С. D.	<ul> <li>The territorial dimension of inequality</li></ul>	124 124 127 130 130 134 140 142 146
B. C. D.	<ol> <li>The territorial dimension of inequality</li></ol>	124 124 127 130 130 134 140 142 142
B. C. D.	The territorial dimension of inequality	124 124 127 130 130 134 140 140 142 146 147
B. C. D.	<ul> <li>The territorial dimension of inequality</li></ul>	124 124 127 130 130 134 140 140 140 142 146 147 147
B. C. D. Chap Emplands	The territorial dimension of inequality	124 124 127 130 130 134 140 140 142 146 147 147 149 150 151
B. C. D. Chap Empi and s A.	The territorial dimension of inequality	124 124 127 130 130 134 140 140 142 142 145 151 151
B. C. D. Chap Empi and s A.	The territorial dimension of inequality	124 124 127 130 130 134 140 140 142 146 147 147 149 150 151 151

	4.	Quality considerations	. 157
	5.	Labour-market integration of disadvantaged groups	
C.	Tr	ends for the future	. 160
D.	Ро	licies for reducing inequality in the labour market	162
	1.	Labour institutions in the spotlight	162
	2.	Economic security and labour market inclusion: capacities, representation,	
		income and quality of work	164
	3.	The challenges of labour institutions: reconciling market efficiency and	
		protection of workers	168
Chaj	nter	VI	
		social gaps	. 171
A.		nderstanding and combating inequality	
• • • • •		ew approaches to social policy in Latin America and the Caribbean	
		Reforming the reforms of the 1980s	
C.		ructural parameters of well-being and social protection	
	1.	Countries with severe well-being gaps	
	2.	Countries with intermediate well-being gaps	
	3.	Countries with small well-being gaps	
D.	Th	e components of a welfare state	
E.		wards a redistributive system of monetary transfers: when ethical	
		d pragmatic concerns coincide	192
	1.	Combating inequality and the juvenilization of poverty	. 193
	2.	Dealing with old-age insecurity	
	3.	Towards a less vulnerable labour market: unemployment protection	203
	4.	Summing up	204
F.	Th	e lever of education	206
	1.	Universalizing preschool education and extending the school day	207
	2.	Greater equality in secondary education outcomes, with smaller learning gaps	209

# Chapter VII

State,	political action, fiscal policy and social covenants: an equation in the making	213
A.	Where we are coming from	213
B.	Where we want to go: recreating the link between the State and society	214
C.	Towards a new State architecture: the main approaches for closing gaps and	
	opening trails	216
	1. The macroeconomic environment	216
	2. Production convergence	218
	3. Territorial convergence	219
	4. More and better employment	220
	5. Closing social gaps	221
D.	Taxation as the key to linking the State with equality	223
	1. The place of public spending in development	223
	2. The progressive effects of income and expenditure	225

	3.	A progressive and efficient tax structure	228	
	4.	The fiscal covenant for distributive equity	233	
E.	The	e importance of social covenants for equality and strategic development	236	
	1.	Social covenants and equality	237	
	2.	Labour covenants	241	
	3.	Covenants and learning: a look at the positive experience of alliance-building		
		between agents	242	
	4.	By way of conclusion	245	
Epilo	Epilogue		247	
Biblio	Bibliography			

## Tables

Table I.1	Real GDP growth	. 17
Table I.2	Global and regional per capita GDP growth, 1970-2007	. 24
Table II.1	Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries): GDP growth, 1971-2009	. 53
Table II.2	Latin America (19 countries) and the world: annual variation in GDP,	
	exports and non-export GDP, 1990-2008	. 66
Table III.1	Latin America (selected countries): productivity indices	. 89
Table III.2	United States: productivity indices	. 90
Table III.3	Latin America (selected countries) and the United States:	
	internal convergence and relative productivity	. 91
Table III.4	Latin America (selected countries): relative productivity	
	with respect to the United States	
Table III.5	Latin America (selected countries): structure of employment, 1990-2008	. 94
Table III.6	Latin America (selected countries): share of employment, GDP and exports	
	for different types of enterprises	. 95
Table III.7	Relative productivity of various agents compared with that	
	of large enterprises	. 96
Table III.8	Latin America: trade balance	. 99
Table III.9	Research and development expenditures	. 102
Table III.10	Latin America (selected countries): spending by institutions that support	
	small and medium-sized enterprises, 2005	. 118
Table IV.1	Latin America and members of OECD (both selected countries):	
	variation in gaps between per capita GDP of the richest	
	and poorest regions, by country	. 127
Table IV.2	Latin America (selected countries): summary of beta convergence	
	outcomes, by periods	. 129
Table V.1	Latin America: relative labour income of urban employed working between	
	35 and 45 hours per week, by level of education and sex	. 156
Table V.2	Latin America: indicators of women's labour market integration	. 158
Table V.3	Latin America: labour income of urban employed women working	
	between 35 and 45 hours per week, relative	
	to men, by level of education	. 159
Table V.4	Latin America: combinations of labour and social protection	. 169
Table VI.1	Latin America (country groups): selected well-being indicators	. 188

Table VI.2	Latin America (16 countries): coverage, benefits and poverty reduction achieved by transferring one poverty line to	
	children aged under 5, around 2008	197
Table VI.3	Latin America (16 countries): coverage, benefits and poverty reduction	
	achieved by transferring one half poverty line to children	
	aged 5 to 14, around 2008	198
Table VI.4	Latin America (16 countries): coverage, benefits and poverty reduction	
	achieved by transferring one poverty line to persons aged	
	65 and over, around 2008	202
Table VI.5	Latin America (16 countries): coverage, benefits and poverty reduction	
	achieved by transferring one poverty line to unemployed persons,	
	around 2008	204
Table VI.6	Latin America (16 countries): impact of a basic transfer on poverty	
	and equity	
Table VI.7	The Caribbean: public spending on education	212
Table VII.1	Latin America: tax revenue of central government, including social	
	security contributions	229
Table VII.2	The Caribbean: tax revenue of central government, excluding social	
	security contributions	229
Table VII.3	Latin America and Europe (selected countries): income inequality	
	before and after taxes and transfers, 2008	233
Figures		
Figure I.1	Growth in world trade by volume	18
Figure I.2	Latin America and the Caribbean: GDP growth, 2009	20
Figure I.3	Latin America and the Caribbean: per capita GDP growth, current-	
	account balance and overall fiscal balance	20
Figure I.4	The Caribbean: GDP growth, 2002-2009	21
Figure I.5	Countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development:	
	real-term growth in actual and potential GDP, 2010-2014	24
Figure I.6	International trade volume growth	26
Figure I.7	Annual growth in external assets reported to the Bank for	
	International Settlements, March 2006 to June 2009	28
Figure I.8	Scenarios for greenhouse gas emissions from 2000 to 2100 (in the absence	
	of additional climate policies) and projections of surface temperatures	35
Figure I.9	Latin America and the Caribbean: ratio of per capita energy	
	consumption to per capita GDP, 2007	35
Figure I.10	Latin America and the Caribbean: per capita GDP and energy	
-	intensity, 2007	36
Figure I.11	Latin America and the Caribbean: energy consumption growth, 1970-2007	36
Figure II.1	Latin America (19 countries): annual inflation rates, 1985-2009	50
Figure II.2	Latin America (19 countries): central government primary	
0	and overall balance, 1990-2008	51
Figure II.3	Latin America and developed countries: per capita GDP	
~	and income distribution, 2008	55
Figure II.4	Latin America (19 countries): gross fixed capital formation, 1970-2009	55

Figure II.5	Latin America (19 countries): annual variation in GDP and aggregate	
	demand, 1990-2009	56
Figure II.6	Latin America and the Caribbean: fiscal revenues and	
	expenditures, 2008-2009	59
Figure II.7	Latin America (19 countries): external shocks and growth in aggregate demand, 1990-2009	59
Figure II.8	Latin America (19 countries): net capital flows and real exchange	
0	rate, 1980-2009	61
Figure II.9	Latin America (19 countries): output gap and gross investment rate, 1970-2009	64
Figure III.1	Latin America (selected countries) and the United States:	
0	relative productivity and coefficient of variation	92
Figure III.2	Argentina, Brazil and the United States: wage variation coefficients	
Figure III.3	Latin America (selected countries) and the United States: productivity	
0	and breakdown of industrial value added	100
Figure III.4	Relative productivity index of Latin America (selected countries) and	
0	productivity in the United States	103
Figure III.5	Latin America (four countries) and the United States: structure	
0	of energy consumption and productivity	107
Figure III.6	Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico: energy gap and relative productivity compared with the United States, 1996-2006	
Figure IV.1	Latin America: distribution of territories according to brackets of total	
0	GDP, around 2003	125
Figure IV.2	Latin America and OECD countries: territorial concentration and	
0	disparities, around 2003	126
Figure IV.3	Latin America (selected countries): sigma coefficient, 1990-2006	129
Figure IV.4	Latin America and the Caribbean (20 countries): prevalence of chronic	
0	undernutrition (stunting), maximum and minimum values by country,	
	according to World Health Organization (WHO) standards	133
Figure IV.5	Latin America: average structure of subnational revenues, 1997-2007	
Figure V.1	Latin America and the Caribbean: labour market participation,	
0	employment and unemployment, 1990-2009	153
Figure V.2	Latin America: urban population employed in low productivity sectors,	
0	around 1990, 2002-2003 and 2007-2008	153
Figure VI.1	Latin America (16 countries): Gini index, 1990-2008	
Figure VI.2	Latin America and the Caribbean: poverty, indigence, employment,	
0	unemployment and the Gini coefficient, around 2002-2008	174
Figure VI.3	Latin America (18 countries): trends in social public spending and	
0	total public spending	178
Figure VI.4	Latin America (15 countries): distribution of public expenditure on	
0	social welfare and examples of cash transfers under selected	
	conditional transfer programmes, by primary income	
	quintile, 2005-2008	181
Figure VI.5	Latin America: number of dependants per formal worker	
Figure VI.6	Child poverty ratios around 1990, 2002 and 2008: children	100
guie + 1.0	aged 0-14 compared with those aged over 14	195
	agea o 11 comparea with those agea over 14	175

Figure VI.7	Latin America (16 countries): cost of transferring one poverty line to children aged under 5, around 2008	. 196
Figure VI.8	Latin America (16 countries): cost of transferring half the poverty line	
<b>F</b> : 1/10	to children aged 5 to 14, around 2008	. 196
Figure VI.9	Latin America (18 countries): percentage of households with a member	
	aged 65 or over who receives a retirement benefit or pension,	• • • •
	by income levels, around 2007	. 200
Figure VI.10	Latin America (16 countries): cost of transferring one poverty line	
	to persons aged 65 and over, around 2008	. 201
Figure VI.11	Latin America (16 countries): cost of transferring one poverty line	
	to the unemployed, around 2008	. 203
Figure VI.12	Latin America (16 countries): cost of all income transfers to	
	vulnerable households and all households	. 205
Figure VI.13	Latin America (12 countries): children aged 3 to 5 attending an educational	
	establishment, around 2007	. 208
Figure VI.14	Latin America (18 countries): lower and upper secondary school	
	completion among young people aged 20 to 24, by household	
	income quintile and sex, around 2006	. 209
Figure VI.15	Educational outcomes and the Gini coefficient	. 211
Figure VII.1	Latin America (18 countries): Gini coefficient for primary per capita income	
_	and total per capita income of households, around 2008	. 226
Figure VII.2	Latin America and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and	
-	Development (OECD): public transfers and Gini coefficient	. 227
Figure VII.3	Latin America and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and	
-	Development (OECD): income tax and Gini coefficient	. 227
Figure VII.4	Global comparison of tax burden and per capita GDP in purchasing power parity	. 230
Figure VII.5	Latin America and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and	
0	Development (OECD): tax revenue and per capita GDP, 2007	. 230
Figure VII.6	Latin America and the Caribbean and the Organisation for Economic	
0	Co-operation and Development (OECD): comparison of income taxation	. 231
Figure VII.7	Latin America (18 countries): people who believe that the tax burden	
1.8010 110	is very heavy, by degree of confidence in tax spending and social	
	gaps in countries, 2003 and 2005	235
Figure VII.8	Latin America (18 countries): confidence in political institutions by	00
inguie ( inc	perception of fairness as regards income distribution, 1997-2007	. 239
Boxes		
Box II.1	Growth of the deficit in the Caribbean	. 57
Box II.1 Box II.2	Capital control: an ounce of prevention	
Box IV.1	Territories of citizenship: an equality policy with a territorial focus	
Box IV.1 Box IV.2	Decentralization and equality in Latin America	
Box IV.2 Box VI.1	Social protection: beyond the contributory rationale	
Box VI.1 Box VI.2		
Box VI.2 Box VI.3	Social spending and social investment	
Box VI.3 Box VI.4	Health systems: financing and stratification	
DOX V1.4	Methodology for estimating the costs of transfers	. 174

## Diagrams

Diagram III.1	Matrix of production development and energy sustainability	105
Diagram III.2	Another empty box? The energy gap and the productivity gap, 1996-2006	107

## Maps

Map IV.1	South America: population aged under 18 years with at least one serious	
	hardship in smaller administrative regions, around 2000	131
Map IV.2	Central America: population aged under 18 years with at least one serious	
	hardship in smaller administrative regions, around 2000	132
Map IV.3	Greater Buenos Aires: selected socio-economic indicators, 2001	136
Map IV.4	Mexico City: selected socio-economic indicators, 2000	137
Map IV.5	Greater Santiago: selected socio-economic indicators, 2002	138
Map IV.6	Metropolitan area of Lima: selected socio-economic indicators, 2007	139



# Foreword

The deepening of democracy as a collective order and as a shared global imaginary calls for greater equality of opportunities and rights. This means extending public participation and decision-making to broad sectors of society that have been marginalized for centuries while also enhancing the effective ownership of economic, social and cultural rights. Equality of rights goes beyond the structuring of opportunities on the basis of merit. It means that citizenship, as an irreducible value, fully endows people with the right, by the mere fact of their being part of society and regardless of individual achievements and monetary resources, to access certain minimum levels of social welfare and recognition.

Deepening democracy also means moving towards greater equality in access, especially in fields such as education, health, employment, housing, basic services, environmental quality and social security. When translated into minimum (and incremental) thresholds for welfare and benefits, equal rights indirectly impose limits on inequality in access, especially when this inequality, at some point, means that part of society is deprived of the access legally provided for under an entitlement-based approach to rights.

The concept of equal rights provides the framework and basis for regulating social covenants that generate greater opportunities for those who have less. A fiscal covenant that envisages tax structures and tax burdens with a greater redistributive effect, while strengthening the role of Government and public policy so as to ensure the welfare threshold is respected, is part of the equality agenda, as is the creation of labour institutions that protect worker safety.

A democratic order in which the course of development reflects the will of the majority and enables all stakeholders to participate also reflects the value of equality. A set of economic policies that are implemented with a long-term vision of production, labour, social development and territorial development and seek not only equal opportunities, but also concrete achievements in terms of narrowing existing gaps is the cornerstone of the equality agenda.

Ensuring equal rights neither erodes meritocracy nor discourages individual efforts. On the contrary, it promotes a sense of belonging that motivates people to contribute to the common

good and economic progress, as it results in more effective rights and stronger protection for all. The process calls for the involvement of a wider range of actors and their contribution to the common good. The complementary interfaces of equality, social protection, organized solidarity and the good will of all stakeholders is precisely what the most advanced welfare States of the world have achieved. This does not mean that the benefits of the market are denied; it means that the market becomes a more inclusive institution in which healthier interactions take place. More solid public-private partnerships, more advanced democracies and more shared visions of long-term development arise in more equal societies where the State plays a more active role and acts within the framework of a strategic vision to achieve well-being and progress for all. This is thus a progressive and far-reaching political agenda.

In this regard, the analysis presented in this document wholly adheres to the idea that social equality and the kind of economic dynamism that transform production patterns are not at odds with each other and that the challenge is to find synergies between the two. The proposal made here is headed in this direction and leads to the next point: when we speak of equality we do so in the awareness that we must grow to equalize and equalize to grow. At no point, therefore, do we suggest that we should sacrifice the value of dynamic economic and productive growth on the altar of equality. In strategic terms and in the long term, equality, economic growth and environmental sustainability must go hand in hand, mutually supporting and reinforcing one another in a virtuous dialectic.

We therefore propose growth with less structural heterogeneity and more productive development, and the pursuit of equality through the enhancement of human capacities and the mobilization of State energies. We want to reverse the huge disparities in the region by building more cohesive societies around productive dynamics, constructing positive social and territorial synergies, and strengthening the protection of individuals through improvements in labor markets, stronger financial capacities and better public administration. Just as the idea of equality entails addressing social vulnerabilities, we believe that a macroeconomic framework that protects people against external volatility will play a key role. This goal will not be reached automatically and requires effective policies on several fronts as well as more and better markets. If you have to level the playing field, it must be done by raising average and aggregate productivity and income.

Lastly, in considering the value of equality and how it combines with growth, we cannot ignore climate change, a phenomenon which will have an enormous impact on the future of humankind. In this context, equality means solidarity with future generations, whose situation will be marked by greater uncertainty and by a greater scarcity of natural resources. It also means calling for international agreements to mitigate the impact of climate change that adhere to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities so as to ensure that it is not the poor or poor countries who end up bearing the brunt of the costs of climate change. It means rethinking the development paradigm on the basis of more compassionate and benevolent relationships among all peoples and of a more environmentally friendly relationship with nature.

In short, equality transforms the dignity and well-being of people into an irreducible value, makes democratic life inseparable from social justice, links access and opportunities with effective citizenship and thereby strengthens the sense of belonging; it becomes the ethical and political basis for pursuing universal coverage of benefits, not only in terms of access but also in terms of narrowing gaps in the quality and trajectories; it provides the regulatory framework for the fiscal covenant and the social covenant, from which emerges the binding force of the rights that have been ratified and their implications for progressiveness and redistribution; it demands a larger and better role for the State in regulation, transparency, oversight and redistribution of resources and requires a deep respect for global security in order to ensure environmental sustainability.

In the proposal now being submitted by ECLAC for consideration by the Governments of Latin America and the Caribbean, development is conceived in the terms outlined above. In the light of the current challenges, it recreates the technical expertise acquired by the Commission over six decades of intensive study and puts forward a desirable future for the region, one that is more egalitarian as regards opportunities and rights, more dynamic and less vulnerable in terms of its economy, and in which the vicious circle of underdevelopment is transformed into a virtuous circle of development. This proposal upholds the core values to which we adhere unreservedly with the technical rigor that is part of the Commission's heritage.

Why do we endorse equality as a value? The answer is that we are transmitting what we perceive to be a historical claim that has long been voiced and systematically deferred in Latin American and Caribbean societies. This claim has given rise, with greater or lesser success, to revolutions and reforms, different models of government and policy, popular movements, agreements between groups and demands from the wide array of stakeholders. But, just as equality, as a positive value, has been acclaimed throughout the collective history of the region, it has also been systematically denied by that very history. Inequality has permeated five centuries of racial, ethnic and gender-based discrimination in the region, in societies where people are divided into first- and second-class citizens. It has permeated a modernization process built on the back of the worst income distribution in the world. It has permeated recent decades in the region's history, the worsening of the structural heterogeneity of productive opportunities, the deterioration of labour conditions and the segmentation of access to social protection, with inequalities developing on all sides. It permeates the asymmetries that abound in the face of globalization.

Yet the more prevalent the inequality, the more profound the desire for equality, especially when the course of history is suddenly interrupted by a worldwide crisis which the future demands be converted into a turning point. In this way, the crisis that broke out in 2008 on a global scale is a point at which equality appears once again as an intrinsic value of the development that we are pursuing. In attempting to narrow these gaps, society moves from an individual to a collective approach and seeks to stitch up the wounds of inequality with the threads of social cohesion.

Under the financial model that dominated the world for decades up until recently, inequalities became more acute than ever and evoked widespread indignation in the wake of the crisis when the model was completely discredited. It might be possible to mitigate the financial repercussions, but the global awareness acquired over the past year regarding the arbitrary nature of the model will not be easily erased, nor will the indignation caused by its inequities.

This is why we wanted, and not without a certain degree of boldness, to give this document the title "Time for equality". We are not talking about any kind of equality, however: the lessons of history stand us in good stead once again. When we speak of equality we refer to another great value that has also had to be fought for and needs to be built on constantly: democracy. Equality without democracy is equality without basic rights and without the rule of law, in other words, a contradiction in terms. It should be noted, however, that a low-quality democracy with little involvement of the broadest range of agents in decision-making processes will make it difficult to forge the political will needed to move towards greater equality. This is our proposal. In the pages that follow, we closely examine the signs of development (and underdevelopment) in recent decades and the vicissitudes and consequences of the recent crisis. We also look to a future in which the State and political action harmonize democracy with equality, promote leaps in productivity and environmental sustainability, inclusive markets and active citizenship, and generate the necessary social covenants in Latin America and the Caribbean, a region in which there are gaps to close and trails to open.

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