The Missing Link – bridging between social movement theory and conflict resolution:
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ABSTRACT

This paper explores what benefits the theoretical development, operationalisation and implementation of conflict resolution can get from bridging with social movement theory. Four different social movement theories are included: the political process, resource mobilisation, collective behaviour- and the new social movement approach. For conflict resolution Peter Wallensteen's theoretical approach is used. The analysis is limited to the post-Cold War period and intrastate conflicts (civil wars and state formation conflicts). This covers 95% of all post-Cold War conflicts. Four questions are asked and answered: 1. What does the link between social movement theory and conflict resolution look like?; 2. How can social movement theory benefit the development of conflict resolution theory?; 3. How can social movement theory benefit the operationalisation of conflict resolution theory?; 4. How can social movement theory and social movements be beneficial for the implementation of conflict resolution theory (i.e. conflict resolution)? The theoretical findings are tested on one case study (East Timor). The theoretical analysis shows that there exist a link between social movement theory and conflict resolution on all levels. The case study confirms the theoretical findings.

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1. The Missing Link – bridging between social movement theory and conflict resolution

This paper aims to create a third path for the theoretical development, operationalisation and implementation of conflict resolution theory by bridging theoretically and empirically to social movement theory. Traditionally there has been little contact and dialogue between the two schools of thought as they are found on the opposite sides of the study of political science. Social movements and social movement theory are normally leaning towards a constructivist ontological position and qualitative methods. Conflict analysis and the study of conflict resolution on the other hand are focusing more on quantitative method and in most cases adhere to a more positivistic position on knowledge. This division in research methodology has negative effects for both the possibility to cooperate, and following on the level of cooperation. When cooperation has taken place this has been in connection to limited and specific aspects of conflict resolution, such as the role of NGOs, developmental issues, and human rights. This cooperation should not be dismissed as such, but it has had limited impact on the development and implementation of theory. This is most unfortunate since this kind of cooperation is potentially beneficial for both. This paper is a humble attempt to overcome at least some of this problem.

There are no reasons, either theoretical or empirical, not to bridge and combine social movement theory (SMT) and conflict resolution theory (CRT). This paper will examine if there exist a link between social movement theory and conflict resolution, and if so, what this link looks like (arrow 3). The paper will also explore how social movement theory and social movements can be beneficial for the development, operationalisation and implementation of conflict resolution theory (arrow 1).

Theoretically conflict resolution theory has potential to benefit from social movement theory, especially in regard to the creation of the parties' interests and identity, as well as the understanding of their dynamics and thinking (model 1, arrow 1). This benefit could also enhance the understanding of the construction and development of conflicts which today by most scholars, including the author, are seen as social constructions. On the empirical level the link between social movements (SM) and conflict resolution processes (CR) is undeniable (arrow 2). In the post-Cold War setting numerous social movements act on all levels of the global arena. They do without question make an impact on the agenda setting with regard to a range of important issue. Many parties in intrastate conflicts are in fact are social movements. And today virtually all conflicts are intrastate. In the 1989-2006 period 95 per cent of all

conflicts has been intrastate. (Harbom & Wallensteen 2007). Social movements are also active as third parties in conflict resolution processes (Weissmann 2008). Consequently social movements can be assumed to be both of importance for conflict resolution processes, and the understanding of these movements to be of importance for the ability to resolve conflicts. The other main actor, the state, has always been and is continuing to be analysed, thus there is a discrepancy in knowledge between the two aspects. This discrepancy is noteworthy since as we have seen the lion part of all conflicts involve social movements as parties.

The theoretical and empirical links identified (SMT --> CRT and SM --> CR) does not in themselves prove a link between social movement theory and conflict resolution, nor what such a link if in existence looks like (arrow 3). This is the case even though it can be assumed that social movement theory and social movements and conflict resolution theory and conflict resolution respectively is integrated (arrow 4 and 5). We cannot be certain that it is the variables of SMT that impacts on CRT is the ones linked to the conflict resolution outcome (SMT --> CRT --> CR). Nor can we be certain that it is the theoretical aspect of social movements that is what creates their conflict resolution impact (SMT --> SM --> CR). It could simply be that social movements are used as a third party proxy, by default as conflicting party, or that they in some way could be exchanged for something else in the conflict resolution process. In the same way the theoretical integration and bridging between SMT and CRT might in fact be a purely academic exercise having nothing to do with actual conflict resolution. In other words, we do in fact not know for certain if social movement theory can be beneficial for conflict resolution (SMT --> CR). Further development of as well the theoretical and empirical framework is necessary if to find out if so is the case, and if so, how social movement theory is beneficial for conflict resolution.

This study is based on five assumptions and four questions. The four research questions are

dependent on that the five assumptions hold. Hence the assumptions will be tested before any of the research questions can be answered. If anyone assumption does not hold, it will be problematic to give a valid answer to the research questions.

Research Questions:

Question 1: What does the link between social movement theory and conflict resolution looks like? (SMT --> CR)

Question 2: How can social movement theory benefit the development of conflict resolution theory? (SMT --> CRT)

Question 3: How can social movement theory benefit the operationalisation of conflict resolution theory? (SMT --> OCRT)

Question 4: How can social movement theory and social movements be beneficial for the implementation of conflict resolution theory (i.e. conflict resolution)? (SMT, SM --> CR)

Underlying Assumptions:

Assumption 1: There exist a link between social movement theory and conflict resolution (SMT --> CR).

Assumption 2: Social movement theory can be beneficial for the operationalisation of conflict resolution theory (SMT --> OCRT).

Assumption 3: Social movement theory can be beneficial for conflict resolution theory (SMT --> CRT).

Assumption 4: Social movements can be beneficial in conflict resolution processes (SM --> CR).

Assumption 5: Social movement theory can be beneficial for the implementation of conflict resolution theory (SMT --> CR).

To be able to examine the possible link between social movement theory and conflict resolution we will systematically move from an all-inclusive general theory of social movements and conflict resolution, through the operationalisation of theory, down to the implementation in actual conflict resolution (model 2). The aim is to focus and analyse the possible link between social movement theory and conflict resolution through both social movements (SMT --> SM --> CR) and through conflict resolution theory (SMT --> CRT --> OCRT --> CR), this to be able to integrate the theoretical and practical aspects of conflict resolution. This mainly theoretical analysis will thereafter be tested empirically in a case

study (East Timor).

Firstly, the focus will be on general theoretical approaches. The fundamental social movement theories from which the whole analysis starts will be introduced. General conflict and conflict resolution theory will thereafter presented and then analysed and compared with social movement theory. The purpose is to find similarities as well as common characteristics and denominators. After having introduced the fundamental general theories, the analysis will continue with the operationalisation of theory. Here an operationalised model for conflict resolution will be presented and analysed, and a similar comparison as above will be made to find out whether the linkage with social movement theory still holds in the operationalised form of conflict resolution theory. A move will then be made to the operationalisation of social movement theory. The presented social movement theory will be operationalised and different social movements and their direct linkage to theoretical approaches will be identified. The focus will here be relatively general, to be able to keep a clear and direct linkage to the theoretical foundations of the different movements, something that would be difficult if focusing on particular movements.

Model 2: Overview of Study

Thereafter we will continue with the implementation of our operationalised conflict resolution theory on intrastate conflicts, both in civil wars and in state formation conflicts. To

be able to control the SMT --> CRT --> OCRT --> CR linkage the same theoretical model as has been used for the operationalisation will be used. We will now apply our operationalised form of social movement theory on the framework for conflict resolution presented. The accurateness of the above theoretical analysis will thereafter be tested empirically on one case. This study will in depth analyse both the resolution process and the impact of social movements. The result of the case study will then be compared and combined with the result of the theoretical analysis. This comparative analysis allows us to draw further conclusions concerning the validity of the theoretical part, and we can better assess impact of, and gains possible to draw from, social movements theory.

2.   General Theory

2.1   Social Movement Theory

Social movements are here defined as informal networks of interaction with shared beliefs and solidarity in support of a social goal. The goal includes either the implementation or the prevention of a change in society's structure and/or values. Social movements are all essentially collective in the sense that they result from more or less spontaneous coming together of individuals whose relationship are not defined by rules and procedures but merely by, at a minimum, a common outlook on society. Social movements need not be organised, but can be. When the term social movement organisation/group is used it refers to a structuralised social movement, or part of the same. A registered political party is not considered a social movement in itself, but its members often belong to one or several social movements. For example, the Swedish Green Party is not itself a social movement, but its members struggle for broad issues such as a better environment, to narrow ones as a new law about animal transportation is considered social movements.

Since the 1960s social movements have been a permanent component of Western civilisation, and the roots to the recent debate about social movement theory also has its intellectual roots in that period (Kornhauser 1959; Lipsky 1968). Social movements as a phenomena is not new as such and social movements have existed through history (for example the anti-slavery and the women movement) but before the 1960s little theorising were done about social movements, and then the focus of as well theoretical as empirical research was on class and class analysis. When tracing the origins a division needs to be made between the North American and European developments that are in a sense very different. In North America social movement theory developed as a reaction to structural-functionalist models of explanation to social conflicts, while in Europe it developed as a reaction towards structural

versions of Marxism. As a consequence, in Europe the focus was on why social movements arise in the first place, while in North America one focused on how social movements mobilises and act, and how they can or shall do to be effective in their struggle to mobilise the recourses necessary to influence and possibly change the system. It should be noticed that today this division is not as clear, and in fact the boarders are so blurred that you in many cases cannot talk about any separation. However, for analytical purposes we will in this paper keep the two approaches separated.

Table 1: Approaches to Social Movement Theory

APPROACH	QUESTION ASKED
Europe	
New Social Movement Approach	Why does social movement arise?
North America	
Resource Mobilisation	When and how are movements mobilising?
Collective Behaviour	How does social and cultural change occur?
Political Process	How does use the political opportunity structure?

New social movements approach is not a theory in the traditional since, but is more of an approach putting the emphasise and importance on the individual as an actor asking the question about why social movements arise in the first place. It tries to get away from class as an explanatory model and the economic reductionism of Marxism. In short, it opposes the intrusion of the state and the market in social life and attempts to reclaim the identity of the individual (Melucci 1989, 1996). The new social movement approach is the theoretical foundation for numerous so called new social movements, movements which, as well as new social movement theory, also stands for a critique of conventional politics and the existing structures, and therefore focus on the importance of the formation and creation of the individuals personal-, collective-, and public identity and interests. The argument is that there is no border between the private and the public. (della Porta & Diani 1999; Foweraker 1995; Johnston et al 1999; Melucci 1999) Examples of new social movements are the Gay and Lesbian movement (Adams 1995; Cruikshank 1992), antinuclear movement (Price 1989), the Green Movement (Bahro 1986; McCormick 1989), the Peace Movement (Carter 1992; Kaltefleiter & Pfaltzgraff 1985) and the Women's movement (Dahlerup 1986; Mueller 1999; Ryan 1992).

The *resource mobilisation* approach on the other hand focus on how movements mobilize, rather than why this is happening. Resource mobilisation is actor-oriented, but focuses on the

dynamics and tactics of the movements rather than the reason for their existence. It assumes that social discontent is universal and that social problems exist at all times in all societies, but that collective action will not happen automatically. The central question is therefore when it is possible to mobile recourses for action, and how this happens. Recourse mobilisation is focused on a functional model assuming rational actors and dismisses psychological factors such as frustration and alienation. (Foweraker 1995) Hence movements are perceived as goal-oriented , struggling to acquire recourses to fulfil their goals, as well as striving to increase both their absolute- and relative power (Costain 1992). Resource mobilisation is the approach which puts the strongest emphasise on the benefits and necessity of strong organisations and leaders (much in line with the ideas of Max Weber (1919, 1922)[1]).

The *collective behaviour* approach is concerned with social and cultural change. It emphasises that social movements are important for both the normal function of society, as well as for the process of change in the existing social structure and the normative order. These changes are to be, to quote della Porta and Diani, "interpreted within a process of cultural evolution through which new ideas emerge in the mind of individuals." (1999: 6). In line with this logic, individual are perceived to per automatique challenge the existing political order with different forms of nonconformative actions against the existing order when it no longer can fulfil and respond to the individuals needs and demands. As a result of this collective dissatisfaction the existing social structure, its institutions, and norms will be changed (cf with Sharp 1973). (della Porta & Diani 1999)

The political process approach emphasises the political, organisational and structural aspects of social movements (McAdam 1994; Tilly 1985). The underlying argument is that collative actions and social movements will be naive, ambiguous and uncertain until they are analysed in the context of the political environment and the state (Foweraker 1995: ch2). The underlying argument is that in the real world these factors cannot be dismissed. There exists a "political opportunity structure" which conditions the emergence, strategies and success of social movements activities and collective actions and hence needs to be taken into account if

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[1] Max Weber has theorised "power" and "domination" and argues that the most enduring forms of domination are those seen as "legitimate" by the participants. It is here presumed that power in most cases are exercised by intermediates. Weber has developed three ideal types of legitimacy through which political arrangements might be analysed: "traditional" based on an immemorial order, "charismatic" based on the personal qualities of the leader, and "legal-rational" based on a set of impersonal institution and laws. The problem with charismatic leadership is that when the leader dies so does the authority and its legitimacy, and here the importance of transferring the charismatic authority into an legal-rational institution ("the routinization of charisma"). These

one wants to make a difference, or even an impact (Birnbaum 1988; Eisinger 1973; Klandermans 1988).

2.2   Conflict and Conflict Resolution Theory

The study of war has been with us all through history, in all parts of the world. Among the classical writers are Sun Tzu, Kautilya, Thucydides, Clausewitz and Machiavelli to mention a few. Conflict analysis, and conflict resolution theory is however a much more recent development and it did not become an organised activity until the mid 1950s. Many different propositions have been presented about the causes and dynamics of conflicts and wars, but no consensus has ever been reached. In this paper we will however focus on three different general approaches to the analyses and understanding of conflict. Conflict is here defined as a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources. (Wallensteen 2002: 16). In this paper two different kinds of conflicts will be considered: Civil Wars, defined as intrastate conflicts over government, and state formation conflicts, defined as violent intrastate conflict over territory. For the purpose of this paper one of the conflicting parties must be a state.

Table 2: Theories of Conflicts and Conflict Resolution

Theory	Cause of Conflicts	Conflict Resolution
Conflict Dynamic Approach	Social phenomenon developing in an action-reaction model	Procedures to cope with and/or chance the dynamics
Social Conflict Theory	Grievances about the deprivation and denial of the needs of the parties	Problem-solving of underlying needs, democratic participation
Rational Calculation	Rational actors pursue their own strategies and interests and by own decisions initiate the chain of event that lead to war	Creating a situation where the parties perceive de-escalation of conflict as being rational.

The *conflict dynamic approach* is the classical perception of conflict, today preferred by for example Johan Galtung (1969, 1996), Louis Kriesberg (1992a-b), Christopher Mitchell (1981) and Håkan Wiberg (1976). Conflict is perceived as a social phenomenon that in an action-reaction pattern moves by itself in cycles. The idea is that one action triggers a reaction from the other party, a reaction which in turn causes a new reaction from the first party and so on, and so forth. Conflict resolution according to this approach needs to invent

theories where not developed for social movements, but do apply.

and develop for the parties mutually acceptable procedures for coping with and/or changing the conflict dynamics. The focus is on the procedure of conflict resolution, and instruments such as dialogue, confidence-building measures and the creation of conflict resolution mechanisms.

Social conflict theory focuses on the basic needs and grievances of the conflicting parties, and argues that the origin of conflict is to be found in the deprivation and denial of the needs of the individual parties. Such hardship can for example be ethnic suppression (Gurr 1993) or inadequate or non-existing human rights (Vincent 1986; Donnelly 1989, 1998), and the deprivation and denial of needs can range from relative inequality to a lack of resources for personal subsistence (Booth 1995; Harrison 1992; Renner 1996; Shue 1996). Conflict resolution has in this theory a problem-solving focus on the underlying needs and grievances from where the conflict originates, and the procedures and instruments are here largely the same as in the conflict dynamic approach above though with different content.

Lewis A. Coser has also emphasised the importance of access to the political system as one of the major reasons of conflict, but also as one of the solutions to conflicts. This because it will limit the level of general grievances, as well as the acceptance of not fulfilled needs (Coser 1956, 1967). This is an argument in line with democratic theory emphasising the beneficial aspects of participation (Held 1996).

The rational calculation approach sees conflict as a result of strategic and tactical decisions made by rational actors in their pursuit to fulfil their own interests, decisions that in turn initiate the chain of event that leads to conflict (Wallensteen 2002: 44). Here conflict is not per definition seen as irrational; conflict can very well be in the interests of the actor(s) of different reasons, as we can see in for example the Middle East or in the case of the first World War where conflict were considered rational among extremists on both sides. When attempting to resolve a conflict the same fundamental rational logic applies; to resolve a conflict one needs to create a situation where the parties at least perceive de-escalation, and resolution, of conflict as being more rational than a continuing of the same. This is of course easier said than done, and numerous approaches have been proposed about how to succeeded. Scholars focusing on international negotiation and mediation have emphasised the importance of looking beyond the stated position of the parties of a conflict to understand their real interests (Fisher 1995: 123-126; Fisher & Ury 1991). Others have focused on the importance of the "ripe moment" which appears when, using Zartman's words, the conflict

offers nothing but a "flat, unpleasant terrain stretching into the future" (1989: 268). The idea is that such a situation may lead the parties to reconsider their positions and to rethink their strategies, and it is hence possible to use this opportunity to move toward a resolution of the conflict (Zartman 1989, 1995, 1997). To do so is however not at all simple, especially not since it is often not possible to base the work on the goodwill of the parties; there will always be spoilers which will do anything in their power to destroy any agreement what so ever (Stedman 1997, 1998).[2]

2.3   *Comparison and conclusion - building a theoretical bridge*

In the below model (model 3) a schematic model for bridging general social movement- and conflict theory is presented. The thick arrows represent strong benefits for the specific conflict theory, and the dashed line represents more limited, or uncertain, benefits. After this short introduction, let us continue with our comparison and conclusion which will explain the model.

Model 3: Bridging General Theories

The conflict dynamic approach has much in common with the pragmatic, rational and instrumental understandings of resource mobilisation and the political process approach. Collective behaviour and new social movement theory are for the conflict dynamic approach

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[2] It has also been argued that moral aspects has to be incorporates if one is to reach a durable resolution to a conflict (Kegley & Raymond 1999). If this is the case, it increases the benefits of bridging with social movement theory and using social movements in the conflict resolution process considering their focuses.

of limited help. Both the collective behaviour and the new social movement approach can however possibly be used to increase our marginal understanding of the actors actions and reactions, and hence somewhat enhance our understanding specific aspects and/or cases of conflict dynamics. When understanding how and when conflicts arise much benefits can be gained from resource mobilisation, and the same when attempting to resolve the same conflict. The benefits from resource mobilisation are in essence a result of its instrumental features, and hence it offers instruments that can be used in many ways, conflict resolution here being one such way. To understand and change an action-reaction model, such as the resource mobilisation one, one has to focus on the strategic and tactical actions of the parties, and this is exactly what resource mobilisation does. Here also the political process approach can be very helpful, in the same way but with focus on the state and political structure. The rational calculation approach has a lot in common with resource mobilisation and the political process approaches. The resource mobilisation approach is useful to both understand why actors decide to start a conflict, and also under which circumstances they can be presumed to consider it rational and in their interests to change their actions. It can help in understanding how to best identify and utilise a "ripe moment", and how to pursue and/or avoid having the resolution process destroyed by spoilers. The political process approach can be used when addressing the state and the structure, simply because its focus is on the political structure and the opportunities it is offering. Collective behaviour and new social movement theory can be dismissed because they are not helpful in an rational-actor theory.

Social conflict theory on the other hand can benefit more from the interest based new social movement theory which can be helpful in explaining why and when the movements arise, as well as how they work. This interest based approach question the existing structures and focuses on the individuals' interests. This can give us an understanding of the underlying needs and grievances, and perceptions of the same, from where the conflict originates according to social conflict theory. In a similar way, collective behaviour can be helpful in understanding how to create and direct social and cultural change or changes. For successful problem-solving resource mobilisation can be helpful, as many of its in numerous instruments can be borrowed and/or adopted for the purpose of conflict resolution. The same is the case with the political process approach, from where experiences and instruments to use the political opportunity structure, following the thoughts of Coser, can be found.

To sum up, at this stage where we are analysing general approaches there is seemingly a clear

division between more positivistic, instrumental approaches and those focusing on interests and social aspects of conflict and social movements. However, within these two groupings we have seen that a bridging between conflict-and conflict resolution theory and social movement theory could be beneficial for as well the development theory. But let us now move away from this purely theoretical analysis and continue with the next step of our analysis.

3.   Operationalisation of Conflict Resolution Theory

When moving towards an operationalisation of theory and the actual resolution of conflicts it would be reductionistic to not bridge the different approaches to conflict analysis. The different theories are complementary, emphasising and centring on different aspects of the conflict phenomenon. When integrated into one model it will increase the understanding and ability to resolve conflicts. Such an integration has been attempted successfully by several scholars (Lund 1996; Mitchel 1981; Wallensteen 1994, 2002; Zartman 1989). This analysis will be based upon a model developed by Peter Wallensteen (model 4) (1994, 2002), which is consider the most applicable and appropriate for the purpose of this paper.

Conflict resolution is in this study defined as a social situation where the conflicting parties in an voluntary agreement resolve - and/or dissolve - to peacefully live with their central incompatibilities, accept each other's continued existence as parties and cease all violent actions against each other. This definition draws on Wallensteen (2002: 50) but is somewhat reconfigured. In this definition conflict resolution is seen as a social process, and the importance of the parties themselves and their voluntary action are emphasised. The parties are here defined as those who can put an end to the conflict, something that can create problems when at least one of the parties are not considering the other as legitimate and hence the starting off for example a dialogue would risk being seen as a legitimisation of the other's demands. For an agreement to be voluntary is not the same thing as it being free from external pressure.[3]

Two different major dynamics exists in a conflict; the negative dynamics of formation and escalation of a conflict and positive dynamics of peace building and conflict de-escalation. The shift between these two occurs through actions made by the conflicting parties. Constructive actions can shift a conflict from the dynamic of conflict formation and

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[3] For a discussion on how conflict resolution relates to other concepts such as conflict management and conflict prevention see Swanström & Weissmann 2005.

escalation to the one of peace building and de-escalation, while destructive actions do the opposite. Constructive and destructive actions can occur at the same time and counter each other out; for example, destructive actions as such need not cause a shift if countered by other constructive actions. External actors can here be of importance, but ultimately it is the conflicting parties that have to decide what actions to take.

Model 4: A Synthesises of the Concepts in Conflict Resolution

Adopted from Wallensteen 2002: 58

In the model the arrows illustrates the different dynamics of conflict. A conflict can start in any one corner of the model, it need not as one might think start in the conflict formation corner where the to be conflicting parties are formed, but a conflict can be triggered in any stage of a conflict formation or conflict resolution process (Wallensteen 2002: 58). Let us now examine the five different boxes, starting with conflict formation and escalation then to continue with peace building and de-escalation. Here box 1 is of foremost importance as it concerns the construction of the parties, of which often one is a social movement. In the conflict formation box (box 1) social creation and construction of the parties occur. Some parties are formed deliberately with the purpose to create conflict while others are formed for other reasons and with other purposes. Whatever the case, after having been formed a party starts making itself known and to develop its identity and role in the conflict. The variables in box 1 allows for an understanding of the internal structure as well as the history, mobilisation and financing of the parties, understandings that are essential for efficient conflict resolution.

For conflict resolution it is also important to understand the incompatibilities (box 2) that underlies the conflict; what they are, how they are constructed and from where they derive. The question of the party-party dynamics is also found in this box.

The dynamics in the lower part of the model allows for a search for dialogue, de-escalation and compatibilities (box5) as well as attempt to form shared institutions through which peace can be reached (box4). The detection and understanding of the compatibilities, or overcoming of the incompatibilities is essential. [4] If one cannot identify compatibilities, it is not possible to resolve the incompatibilities and hence the conflict cannot be resolved. Such a search is also important because it has a tendency to create a positive spiral. The formation of shared institutions, that is the creation of structures ranging all the way from simple negotiation forums all the way to permanent bodies such as the European Union, is essential to strengthen and permanent the process of conflict resolution, and to make resolutions durable.

Movement interaction between the two dynamics happens through actions (box 3). These actions can be either constructive ones, such as alliance building and searching for new friends or new perspectives towards the conflict, moving the conflict towards peace building and resolution. Or they can be destructive actions escalating the conflict, ranging from not allowing inter-party communication to acts of war. There is hence no predetermined path towards either escalation or resolution of a conflict, but it can go either way as well as back and forth depending on the types of actions undertaken by the parties. External actors can, and will, of course pressure the conflicting parties, but it is still finally the parties own decisions which path to chose. Conflict are simply not linear and there is no preset chain of events towards resolution; if one want to resolve a conflict a formula for such a progression has to be found. It is important to be aware that all the arrows of dynamic are simultaneously active at any point in time. In short, to quote Wallensteen, "conflicts are not simply escalating and de-escalating, or ... easily predicted and calculated. They are all these simultaneously and that is the reality with which the analysts have to cope." (2002: 60).

3.1   *Linking Conflict Resolution and Social Movement Theory*
Let us now continue with an examination of the possible linkage with and benefits from social movement theory for operationalised conflict resolution. We will here see that such a bridging would increase our understanding of all five parts of the model, and also of the

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[4] Overcoming in the sense that one decides that the issue of incompatibility is no longer of importance, or in some other way are deemed to be of no importance.

dynamics between them. This will help us in our attempts to reverse the conflict process and introduce new theoretical thinking and new perspectives, and hence our possibility to resolve conflicts will increase.

The understanding of the social construction and creation of any party and the development of its identity have a lot to benefit from new social movement theory. Wallensteen's model presents this process without any deeper form of analysis of why the parties are constructed in the first place, and an increase in our understanding of the dynamics of conflict formation will increase our ability to resolve conflicts. This is something that also has been acknowledged out by Wallensteen (2002: 88). The resource mobilisation, collective behaviour and political process approaches are also important here as they increase our understand and analysis of the formation process once it has started, since they are focused on the different actions undertaken, and/or possible to undertake, for the gains of specific movements.

Social movement theory can be helpful in increasing our understanding of incompatibilities. This is especially true for new social movement theory in regard to the underlying and real interest of the parties and resource mobilisation for the understanding of the history, mobilisation as well as the financing and internal structure of the parties in intrastate conflicts. The collective behaviour- and the political process approaches can also be useful instruments as they increase our understanding of the logic and reasons behind the actual behaviour of the parties.

For peace building and the identification/formation of shared interests and hence de-escalation of the conflict social movement theory can help in regard to both the formation of shared institutions and in the understanding and identification of compatibilities. Hence it can be helpful in both laying the ground for conflict resolution, as well as in the development of the same; social movement theory can here help us creating a social situation that makes conflict resolution possible. Nevertheless, the usage of social movement theory is here of a more general kind than in regard to the formation and escalation of conflicts but it can nonetheless be valuable for the process of conflict resolution.

When we are here trying to understand a social situation where two conflicting parties, of which often one is a social movement, are trying to reach a voluntary agreement to live with, or dissolve, their central incompatibilities social movement theory once again can be helpful. Here especially new social movement theory, and possibly also the collective behaviour

approach, can be very helpful in enhancing our understanding of the underlying reasons and dynamics, and how these are created and formed. This increased understanding increase the possibility for both the parties, with or without the influence of external actors, to fulfilling and/or reconfigure its perceived needs, and hence increase the prospects of reaching a durable peace agreement. The other two approaches will help us both to understand the more pragmatic development of actions, and to allow us to adopt methods and instrument to form institutions, identify, and develop compatibilities.

In the understanding of the destructive and constructive actions shifting a conflict between the two dynamics especially two approaches are applicable, resource mobilisation and the political process approach. The former since it can help in our understanding of the tactics and strategies of the actors, and the later because we cannot dismiss the importance of the state and the political opportunity structure which are both central in the kinds of conflicts we are analysing here. The other theories can however also be helpful, but to a more limited extent, because they are addressing the underlying cases and reasons for the actions taken and methods used. This because softer factors such as interpersonal chemistry have not properly addressed the two more functionalistic, rational actor based theories above. This could be exemplified with the importance of personal chemistry for conflict resolution. Compare for example the relationship between John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev whose meetings in Vienna 1961 was followed by an escalation of conflict, and the one between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan & Margaret Thatcher in the late 1980s, which was important for the ending of the Cold War.

4.   Operationalised Social Movement theory

In this section we will examine how the four different approaches to social movement theory are operationalised in social movements. There is no simple empirical answer and the theories are used- and applies in a mixed fashion. Focus will here be on one – two operationalisations of each approach. But also when such a simplification is made there are several overlaps. First some general comments about the model (model 5). As we can see there is a difference between the new social movement- and the collective behaviour approach, and the resource mobilisation- and the political process approach. The latter two affects the whole range of operationalised social movements while the former have a more limited linkage to one type of movements. The reason for is that resource mobilisation and the political process approach are instrumental theories and hence are offering a range of tools useable for any kind of movement.

Model 5: Operationalised Social Movement Theory

On the local level new social movement theory is often underlying the goals and aims of groups and movements, here referred to as *principled local social movements*, struggling for their rights and in some way refutes the conventional politics and political structure. Relevant for conflict resolution is for example movements and groups struggling for autonomy or independence, ethnic rights, human rights or political rights. These groups are generally using instruments borrowed from resource mobilisation and the political process approach to reach their goals, but their strength is in their belief in a principled idea. This form of movements is also found as parties in intrastate conflicts.

In world politics in numerous social movements are found, but here we will only focus on so called *transnational advocacy networks*. These are networks bound together by shared values, a common discourse and dense reciprocal exchanges of information. Their members have some form of principled idea, as for example the peace movement, and a belief in the creative use of information and in the fact that individuals can make a difference. These networks use tactics focusing on persuasion, socialization and pressure, and these tactics are to a large extent adopted from an resource mobilisation and political process approach, but also here an essential component for success is the underlying principled beliefs. (Keck & Sikkink 1998)

Moving on to resource mobilisation, an approach which because of its instrumental features can be found in the actions of most social movements. One of the more clear-cut movements

are here *nonviolent action-based movements* with their ideological base in the works of Gene Sharp, which is arguable the most extensive and successful operationalisation of resource mobilisation to be found (1973).[5] Gene Sharp's approach focus on the sources of power, the role of disobedience, and development of methods of nonviolent actions. Focus is both on when mobilisation occur, and how it has been, is, and can be successful. Even though the Sharp's work is essentially an operationalisation of resource mobilisation, the methods also include thoughts and methods drawn from the political process approach.[6] This form of methods deliberate usage can be found in for example the struggle of Gandhi in India (Sharp 1979),[7] or more recently in the actions of Otpor in Serbia against the Milosevic regime (Chiclet 2001).

Operationalisations and practical occurrences of resource mobilisation's emphasise on the benefits and necessity of leaders can be found on all levels and in numerous examples (*leadership-dependent movements*). Many movements would simply not exist, at least not to the same extent, without strong leaders. Their importance is not limited to those using the movement as a tool, but also includes individuals making brave attempts to make a difference, here often with the formal or informal support from a movement and/or movement organisation. Publicly well known examples are the work of Nelson Mandela, Yasser Arafat, and Martin Luther King- Leadership-dependent movements are also important on the local level. Without driven individuals the new play ground would not be put up nor would the local forest or park be saved. Individuals making a difference can be seen in for example the actions taken by the British Home Secretary Jack Straw and the Spanish judge Baltazar Garzon in regard to the Pinochet case, here with the informal and formal support from the human rights movement. In addition, for individual leaders, tools adopted from the political process approach are often of importance.

Collective behaviour is a somewhat ambiguous approach to operationalise, because in social movement activities it is difficult to differentiate and separate from other approaches. One of the more clear-cut example of collective behaviour today is in the development of a civil

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[5] Not all of these movements would refer to themselves as being based on the thought of Gene Sharp, some might even not be aware of her existence. However, these movements fall within the Sharpian ideological framework knowingly or not.

[6] It can also be argued that Sharp's theories also draws from the collective behaviour approach. This is to a certain extent true, and when the social situation from a collective behaviour perspective is favourable the chance of success for Sharpian methods will also increase. The focus is still however on the pragmatic and instrumental factors in explaining social change and the occurrence of mobilisation.

society.[8] The move towards a civil society is in line with the collective behaviour concern with social and cultural change, and the idea that per automatique nonconformative actions will occur at some point as a result of collective dissatisfaction. Civil society is about the more general and all-inclusive ideas concerning international development and the new concepts of government and participation -situations where the collective dissatisfaction has reached the point where people simply can no longer accept the situation and therefore has been forced to start doing something about it. Examples are the Nestle boycott, actions against child labour, the North-South divide and the so called un-payable debts, and the uncontrolled spread of free trade and market economy which all have sparked as well individual as collectives to take actions. On a more local level collective behaviour can be seen in the reactions to for example paedophilia in Sweden and the Netherlands, against (and for) Front Nationale in France, and aborting in the United States. Lastly, it should be mentioned that also these movements in their attempts to create social and cultural change these forms of movement naturally also borrow instruments and tools from resource mobilisation and the political process approach, but this is a purely instrumental adoption.

Moving on to the political process approach which, as we have seen, can be found in most movements,. This is something natural considering the benefits of using the existing political opportunity structure for one owns goal. An example can be seen in for example Amnesty Business Group to mention just one non-principled social movement. There are however movements that focuses solely on using the system and its opportunities to gain benefits, with a belief that to change the political system one has to adopt and use its structure (compare anarchist and lobby groups). These movements are often non-principled, non-principled in the sense that they are not foremost acting in accordance with a given morality or set of rules but more focused on the special interests, relative gains and power of groups and/or minorities.[9]

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[7] Gandhi's theoretical roots and perspective are however found in the ideas of la Boétie, Tolstoy and Thoreau (Bleiker 2000: 86-93). But the methods he developed are however in line with the ones some years later presented by Gene Sharp.

[8] Civil society is a contentious term and no agreement of its definition exists. Here civil society is seen not as a thing or organisation, but as a movement which to a large extent is a key to future progressive politics containing different more specific interests and agendas, sometimes also conflicting ones. Civil society is the umbrella of many new social movements, but the focus is here on the general change in mindset in the international society and the world. Civil society is both something greater that social movements, but also a part of the movement - this general struggle for change is within the definition used in this paper.

[9] Their aims are often justified by moral arguments, but these are in this case used mainly as tactical and strategic methods and are not the real underlying goals.

5. Implementation of Conflict Resolution

Let us now continue with the practical implementation of empirically operationalised conflict resolution theory. We will here examine how, in the real world, the two types of intrastate conflict addressed in this paper is resolved in the perspective of the presented theory. The two types of intrastate conflict are civil wars and state formation conflicts.

Civil Wars

If the search for a durable resolution of civil wars is to be successful one has to construct a system giving acceptable social and political space to all groups in the society. It is here important to deal as well the participation and influence of individuals and groups in society, as the security of all groups and individuals. In practice the way to resolve these problems have been to give democratisation a central position in the resolution process and settlements. By introducing a democratic system one supposedly changes a situation from a winner - loser dilemma, to one with possibilities to handle the political losers and the changing fortunes of politics (Wallensteen 2002: 132-33, 139-44). The question of human rights has also been introduced, especially after the end of the Cold War, and is often seen as being the dividing line between who is to be allowed to participate and those to be brought to trial (Wallensteen 2002: 140). This is however problematic hence in many cases such a line would risk making a resolution more difficult, or even impossible. This because parties and actors who feels threatened by post-conflict trials will have less, or no, incentive to participate in a resolution. A resolution of the conflict will increase their opponents power and decrease their own safety since they no longer will control the system. Or, as has often been the case, will demand immunity which if granted will undermine the whole idea of such a dividing line making once again the *de facto* definition of human rights into an ad hoc definition.

The security requirement is focused on avoiding internal security dilemmas and to create a situation where both the conflicting parties can feel and be secure (both objectively and subjectively). For a durable conflict resolution to be possible the situation must be one where the winner not only accepts the rights of the loser, but also give the loser a possibility to make a comeback (for example through a democratic system). The loser must here feel secure enough to be able to accept defeat or non-defeat, which at a minimum involves not risk immediate annihilation after accepting a resolution. To fulfil the above is a major task, a task where external actors can be most helpful in negotiation as well as with education and economic aid. (Wallensteen 2002: ch 6).

In other words, to avoid a future return to conflict a resolution must (re)construct a society based on the principles of inclusion, participation and security. The key here is the development of an (active) civil society on which the implementation of durable peace-agreements and conflict resolution directly depends on (Wallensteen 2002: 161). Such a society is fundamental for the possibility to develop a working participatory democratic system. A civil society is fundamental to sustain a transparent democratic society and it works as a safeguard for the returns of autocratic regimes as well as to create a transparent society. Is also important for solving the refugee problem which is endemic in civil wars where it is the same political unit that shall be reconstructed, a reconstructions for which's success the return of refugees is of foremost importance. (Wallensteen 2002: 159-62)

State Formation Conflicts

The focus in the resolution of state formation conflicts tends to be on how to divide territory. Three general forms of resolutions can here be identified: autonomy, federalism and independence. None of the above has any given appearance, and they can be of different forms, and with different restrictions. The underlying idea behind autonomy and federalism is that if an area and its inhabitants is given some form of self-rule allowing not only influence over the central government but also the control over a set number of functions active conflicts can be avoided. In the case of autonomy solutions it has shown to be difficult to find the balancing point that makes both the central government and the autonomy pleased, especially when a dissatisfied population in an autonomy (as well as in a state) tend to believe that independence would solve all their problems (for example Mindanao, East Timor). Federalism is a theoretically attractive solution, but in practise it is problematic to create cooperation and consensus between conflicting parties (Lijphart 1968; 1999); when such do not exist in the first place it is highly unlikely that federalism will create them (Jarstad 2001). Federalism is in practice more of a preventive measure than a post-war solution, and as we can see in the Bosnia-Herzegovina case federation as conflict resolution is most problematic (which is not the same as saying that another alternative would be better).

Independence as a resolution solves a conflict by creating a border between the conflicting parties and can be either with or without restrictions and conditions, such as the right of others to intervene or keep troops in the new state. In this sense the actual power of an independent state and an autonomy can in practice overlap (for example as in the case of Cyprus). The main problem with independence as a conflict resolution instrument is that

people, both inside and outside the independent state, as a consequence has to move permanently which affects their memories, roots as well as economic investments. The impact of this problem can be limited by finding some form of framework for cooperation between the new and the old state. A self-understanding in the centre of the benefits of such a solution, as well as demographic geography will also help minimise these problems, as can be seen in for example the Czech Republic (1993), The Slovak Republic (1993), Norwegian (1905) and East Timor (2002) independences. (Wallensteen 2002: ch 7)

As we have seen all the above solutions are difficult in practice, except when the circumstances are favourable, and they focus on borders between people. This focus is problematic because boarders per se are not the same as security; borders will always create minorities, both inside and outside. Demilitarisation and democratisation will decrease these problems, and the softer the borders the more security will the people need. Integrated solutions focusing on government sharing and/or the influence of the minorities, such as the Åland case, will create more stable resolutions. It does however seem like such resolutions are only open to societies who accepts both the social and legal rights of its minorities, and following they need to be instituted early in a conflict before the polarisation between the parties has started or gone too far. (Wallensteen 2002: 175-81, 196-200)

There is also a role for what Wallensteen refers to as non-armed groups in the creation as well as maintenance of resolutions. This follows the logic of the importance of popular participation, as well as creation and development democratic institutions. Further, such groups can be important in making contacts possible between the armed parties, as well as offering an alternative to armed struggle. (Wallensteen 2002: 199-200).

6.   Social Movements in Conflict Resolution

After examined the linkage between social movement theory and social movement we shall continue with the role of social movements in conflict resolution. The focus will here be on the different movements already presented, this to be able to follow the SMT --> SM --> CR link.

Civil Wars

We have seen above that the development of a civil society is fundamental for the resolution of civil wars and the successful reconstruction of society and the building of a stable democracy. Here the collective behaviour derived civil society aimed movements can be of

fundamental importance.[10] It is of course difficult to point to its instrumental effects, especially at this general level, but as a general support for progression as well as umbrella for other movements. It is relevant in the case of new social movements on both the local and the inter/transnational level because of these movements more concrete and identifiable impact. More specifically, transnational advocacy networks can here be very helpful both in the early and later stages of conflict resolution. In the early stages they can for example pressuring the parties to make constructive moves. In later stages where a new system is to be constructed they can help with the construction of a working state. They can also be external save-guard for regressive moves by the parties by closely monitoring the development. As observers they are also of importance in regard to the security requirements, and further transnational advocacy networks can also be helpful in the execution of both educational and aid tasks. Principled local social movements have a similar role, though their involvement is not only beneficial but fundamental for a resolution. Both in the sense that they can and will have an impact on the progression of the resolution process, but also because a non-involvement and non-confirmative action from this kind of movements risk spoil the whole process.

More instrumental movements focusing in instrumental nonviolent actions can have an impact in the creation if a situation allowing for participation and influence, and hence to the development of a democratic system and the civil society. Their role concerning security is less clear, but as nonviolent principled movement they are not likely to increase violent repression, at least not directly. In the later stages of conflict resolution these movements can be an effective safeguard against non-democratic moves, though they can at the same time create problems in that they are undertaking actions outside the system. For the moves towards a fully democratic system the main impact will come from leadership-dependent movements that are crucial for the post-conflict, pre-democracy period when a combination of commitment and organisational strength are most beneficial.

The role for non-principled social movements are different, and more focused on the building of institutions and social- and political structures. One problematic feature with the movements above is their often partial involvement in the conflict, and hence they tend to often sparkle suspicions from one of the conflicting parties. Here non-principled social

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[10] It can here be questioned what comes first, the movement or the civil society, or if they develop at the same time. However, a civil society can per definition not exist without some form of belief in it, and hence social movements with such a belief must in one way or another exist or be created if a permanent resolution is to be

movements with their focus on the political opportunity system and with goals that does not involve the specific conflict in the sense that they do not have to chose side (for example the Red Cross, and Medicine sans frontier). This gives them more space in regard to for example negotiation, education and economic aid, as well as solution to security problematique and internal security dilemmas. In other words, they can often act more as a third party than other forms of movements has been able to do.

In the solution of refugee problems different movements are important in different ways. The movements creating a civil society, democratic system and a safe environment for everyone are fundamental for a return and re-integration of the refugees, while especially the non-principled social movements are fundamental for the actual returning of the refugees. The solution of the refugee major problems connected to civil wars is very demanding, and further it is not only about willingness, but also about being able to create political as well as economic structures and institutions that can cope with these often enormous problems.

State Formation Conflicts

The operationalised conflict resolution theory does here emphasise the importance of favourable conditions for successful conflict resolution. Social movements can play an important role for the creation of such conditions. First of all it should be emphasised that one of the conflicting parties often are a social movement, or at least have connection to the ideas of some form of principled local social movement. Hence no working agreements or settlement can be reached without social movement involvement. Further, without at least the implicit the consent from different principled local social movements, nonviolent-action groups as well as of non-principled social movements with an investment in the conflict it is highly unlikely that the conditions will be favourable enough to resolve a state formation conflict (compare spoiler theory above). But on the other hand, the same movements can also lay the foundation for autonomy and federalism, as well as independence and integrated solutions to state formation conflicts. These movements are either representing the interests and ideas of the people, and/or can affect the same and hence create the favourable conditions needed. For this development transnational advocacy networks and external non-principled social movements can also be beneficial, with support, knowledge, resources as well as pressure on both internal and external policy makers. When then moving to the stage where the settlement shall be permanent, the role for especially leadership-based movements

possible.

increase, as they have shown to be efficient as transformation government. At this point the focus moves to the importance of building a civil society and the creation of a working democracy. Here the role and weighting of social movement change towards movements focusing on the building of a civil society. Here it should be emphasised that what Wallensteen refers to as non-armed groups in fact often are different kinds of social movement groups.

What social movement involvement can create, especially if there is a combined effort by as well local as external movements towards the same goal, is to find solutions to the problems related to the different solutions of state formation conflicts. In the case of autonomy such cooperation and joint effort can increase the probability to find the balancing point allowing for a viable solution, and in the case of federalism it will increase the possibility to create a framework for cooperation and consensus between the conflicting parties. Also, by getting these movements involved in the peace process one can limit the risk in connection to a dissatisfied population, dissatisfactions that normally is channelled through social movements, and/or used by the same to reach their purposes. When independence is used as a solution, social movements can assist in creating a grassroots acceptance of both the possible conditions, as well as for frameworks of cooperation. The same is the case with integrated solutions. Also in regard to the problems related to using borders as a conflict resolution, an integration of social movements in the process can limit the problems of those not wanting to move permanently, in for example protecting minority rights and freedom of movement and communication.

7.   Testing the Path - Conflict Resolution in Practice

Four criteria have been used when deciding what case to choose for the theory testing: stage of resolution, time, level of social movement involvement, and availability of data. Firstly the conflict should have been resolved, this to make it possible to analyse the whole resolution process. Secondly, the conflict should have been resolved recently in principle the more recent the better, though at a minimum being resolved after the end of the Cold War. This is to avoid having the analysis dismisses as having happened under other circumstances than those existing in the international community today. The underlying reason for this criteria is that during the cold war the international dynamics, in regard to social movements, were different due especially to the bi-polar world order. Thirdly, social movement involvement is necessary for an analyses to at all be possible, and a high level of such involvement is preferable because it increases the accuracy of the analysis. Lastly, there is a need for

available and accurate data about the case.

The case chosen for the purpose of this paper is the East Timor conflict until independence 2002. This is a case which fulfils the four criteria set up above. The social movement involvement in the conflict has been extensive, and it is a conflict that has been closely followed by international media, outside actors and analysts (at least in the later, crucial, stage of conflict resolution). The East Timor conflict is an a conflict with very old origins that has been resolved very recently and can hence the conflict itself can be presumed to be affected by both the cold war dynamics as well as the ones in the international community today. However, before the end of the cold war period there were no effective, if any, conflict resolution processes and hence the conflict resolution phase has been taken place today's dynamics. To point out the actual start of the resolution process phase is however more difficult, and depending on definition of conflict resolution. The resolution process in East Timor can be seen as starting either around or after the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, or around or after the Deli-massacre 1991. The starting point is however of less importance, and the point is simple that the conflict resolution phase in the East Timor case are not affected by the cold war dynamics and hence fulfils the criteria for recently resolved conflicts used in this paper.

7.1   *The East Timor Case*
The Colonial Heritage (1500-1975)

The island of Timor is situated 450 kilometres north of Australia and is part of the Lesser Sundas group of the Indonesian archipelago. The eastern half of the island, which comprises of some 15000 square kilometres, was colonised by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century while the western part fell under Dutch control. That demarcation survived both the national revolution in Indonesia 1945 where independence was sought only in the Netherlands East Indies, and the Sukarno lusts of the 1960s where confrontation was directed only against the Netherlands and Malaysia (Anwar 1998). East Timor did not get onto the international agenda until radical political change in Portugal in 1974 accelerated its decolonisation (colonial power was not seen as being in line with communist ideology).

Intense activity followed in East Timor where 20 May 1974 *Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente (Fretilin)* was formed by a combination of seminary-trained intellectuals and civil servants with links to left-wing groups in Portugal and its colonies in Africa. *Fretilin* demanded complete self-determination and independence for East Timor, but Jakarta

did not like the prospects of a radical state on its border and sponsored a client political party which favoured integration with Indonesia. A political struggle started and it culminated in August 1975 when the pro-Indonesians made an unsuccessful coup attempt, and after three weeks of civil war this attempt had failed and *Fretilin* had gained full administrative control over East Timor. Jakarta's response was to employ more direct action and it used Indonesian forces in an insurgency role, ostensibly as volunteers for the opposition. This direct move did not stop the *Fretilin* that on the 28 November 1975 proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor.

Indonesian Occupation under Suharto (1975-1998)

The Indonesian response came immediately and the day after the Indonesian-backed adversaries mobilised to get East Timor back in line. Two days later, on 1 December formal backing came from the Indonesian foreign minister Adam Malik who announced that the solution to the conflict lay on the battlefield. The military intervention did however not begin until 7 December because of the then US President Gerald Ford and his secretary of state Henry Kissinger presence in Jakarta (Scheiner 2000: 118-9). This military annexation was a less than competent military action but its success was inevitable because of the extreme imbalance of power between the two parties. *Fretilin* both lacked qualified military training and external support, and even though vigorously resisting it was hopeless without backing. The human costs were horrific; of a population of 650,000 an estimated 100,000 inhabitants died as a direct or indirect result of the invasion and the following pacification in the coming three years. Under the following Indonesian occupation, it is estimated that 1/3 of the total population died, that is 200,000 people. It took Indonesia several months before it could incorporate East Timor as its 27th province on 17 July 1976. This incorporation was only recognised by only a dozen states, and it was never recognised by the UN and both the Security Council and the General Assembly called for an Indonesian withdrawal.[11]

In East Timor the armed resistance has continued ever since, though on a more sporadic basis and on a limited scale, encourage by the refusal of the international community and the United Nation to accept the annexation, as well as by a strong local grassroot support. The course of events from 1976 until 1999 (this is especially true for the 1976-1991 period) are however not very well known, but what is clear is that the period has been characterised by starvation, a total negligence of human rights, and an indiscriminate use of force by the

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[11] The United Nations considered East Timor as being Portuguese territory.

Indonesian rulers. The main reason that the situation in East Timor has not received more attention than it has is a combination of the fact that the area and the conflict has been closed from international scrutiny, that it lies far away, and that the Cold War was not beneficial for a left-wing movement such as *Fretilin*. It does however seem like the repressions were somewhat decreased when the most active resistance was struck down. In 1988 president Suharto even declared East Timor an open province, though the reason was to make a visit to the predominantly Catholic population by Pope John Paul II possible 1989. That visit was marked by public demonstrations which were forcefully suppressed by the armed forces, a scenario that was repeated in 1990 when US ambassador John Monjo visited East Timor. Demonstrations and similar activities was in fact undertaken during all foreign visits. The failure to integrate East Timor was striking in the highly publicised massacre, which created an international outrage against Indonesia, of unarmed pro-democracy supporters in the Santa Cruz cemetery on 12 November 1991 where more than 100 of the 2000 or so demonstrators were killed. This incident was a big blow against *Fretilin* that lost many supporters, and the following year another major blow struck the movement when its leader José Xanana Gusmao was captured and sentenced to life imprisonment.

After the massacre the coverage in western media did however increase, but regardless, as late as in May 1995 the Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas saw a solution to the East Timor problem as being a long way off, but since then as we all know a lot has changed. The first good sign of hope was the joint award of the Nobel peace prize to the spiritual leader of East Timor Bishop Carlos Belo and the exiled activist Jose Ramos Horta. The Nobel committee hoped that their award would "spur efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict in East Timor based on the people's right to self-determination." (Norwegian Nobel Committee 1996).

Transformation Towards Independence (1998-2002)

The major turning point came in May 1998 when president Suharto had to resign amid popular protests. The new Indonesian president B.J. Habibie shortly after election suggested to Portugal, to which East Timor still according to international law belonged, a limited autonomy for East Timor within the Republic of Indonesia. The talks progressed and on 5 May 1999 the two parties signed a treaty which entrusted the Secretary-General with organising and conduction what they called a "popular consultation" in order to ascertain if the East Timorese people accepted or rejected a special autonomy within Indonesia. To carry out this consultation UNAMET (The United Nations Mission in East Timor) was established

on 11 June with the mandate to organise a referendum (the consultation) and to oversee the transition period under which the decision should be implemented. (UNTAET 2002)

The vote took place on 30 August the same year and nearly 99% turned up even though pro-Indonesia militias tried to hinder the election, and terrorised the potential voters. The result of the referendum was given from the beginning; the people did not want autonomy but independence and in a last desperate attempt to change this.[12] Indonesian backed militias that had been recruited, financed and armed by the Indonesian Army cheerfully engaged in a rampage of arson and looting; raping hundreds of women and girls; shooting and killing countless people; burning down much of Dili and destroying the country's infrastructure; killing UN staff and forcing the UN to withdraw (Economist 1999c).[13] More than 150000 people fled or were deported to West Timor or other Indonesian islets, operation that were undertaken with direct logistic support from the Indonesian army (Nordquist 2002: 28). In short, the departure of Indonesia seemed to be very much the same as its arrival 24 years earlier.

As a response to this course of events the UN Security Council on 15 September, after consultation with- and authorisation from Indonesia, authorised a multinational force (INTERFET) consisting of 8,000 troops to under the leadership of Australia restore peace and security in East Timor. INTERFET arrived in East Timor on 20 September and was very successful in restoring peace and order, much helped by the support from the East Timorese people. On 26 October 1999, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) officially took over the administration which it was to keep during the transition period before East Timor on 20 May became fully independent and applied for membership in the UN. Now with José Xanana Gusmao once again as the leader, this time after having won a landslide victory in the first free presidential election in East Timor. It is now he who will have to lead, with the help of the newly established United Nation Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), the way towards becoming a fully consolidated and working state.

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[12] When released on 4 September it showed that 78.5% had voted for independence (UNTAET 2002). It should however be noted that this was a shock for Indonesia and especially the Indonesian soldiers who believed that their tactic would have worked. According to some miscalculation per se is in itself one of the reasons for the post-referendum slaughters (Economist 1999b).
[13] It should be pointed out that the Indonesian Army is not under governmental control in the same way as in western states. It has been questioned whether Habibie at all had any control over the actions undertaken by the armed forces' commander General Wiranto, or over the army more generally; the army was against the idea of a referendum all along (Economist 1999d). Here we should also be aware of that the Indonesian Army to a relatively large extent is self-sufficient and has its own income, through both corruption and more legitimate businesses under its control.

East Timor is an example of a state formation conflict, and its successful resolution is in line with the theoretical expectations of conflict resolution theory. The people of East Timor opposed the offer of a special autonomy, as independence was the only acceptable option for the people of East Timor.[14] This offer in itself was a result B.J. Habibie and the Indonesian government's new self-understanding, that something had to be done with the East Timor problem. This newly won independence was in itself conditioned on UN involvement and administration in a transition period. Continuing with the problems related to the creation of a border vis-à-vis security. The characteristics of this case are favourable for such a solution. The Timor island is already divided, with the exception of the Oecussi enclave, and the western and eastern parts have different historical backgrounds under different colonial masters. This minimises ethnically and minority derived problems; few people will have to move, no cultural and historical roots will be demolished since the people living on the Timorese island are already divided into two parts.[15] There also exist, as we will examine further in the following section, non-armed groups that has been most helpful in both the creation and maintenance of the resolutions, and that are very active in the development of a democratic system and civil society.

7.2   The Role of Social Movements

The forgotten struggle (1974-1991)

Principled local social movements have been fundamental for the course of event, both directly and indirectly. Fundamental for the course of event is the fact that virtually all inhabitants in East Timor has all the time been supporters of the idea of self-determination, and this has been fundamental for all aspects of the independence struggle.[16] This has made the support for the *Fretilin* movement extremely strong all through the independence struggle, regardless of Indonesian actions.

Fretilin, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, is a principled local social movement which started as a political movement and got into government for a short period

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[14] Xanana Gusmao expressed a willingness to accept a transition period under Indonesian rule under a transition period in 1998. This option was however not examined further due to violence between pro-autonomy and pro-independence militias in East Timor.

[15] It should be emphasised that the racial and ethnical diversity exist on Timor, as well as in East Timor, but five hundred years of Portuguese colonisation in combination with the Latin Catholic Influence separates the East Timorese identity from the West Timorese one (Gunn 2001).

[16] This almost unanimous support is a result of differences in colonial rule. Indonesia, including West Timor, were colonised by the Dutch and has hence derived their culture and customs from them, while the East Timor has derived theirs from Portugal.

of time in 1975.[17]Since the Indonesian annexation it has been a guerrilla movement using traditional tactics such as ambushing troop transportation, striking Indonesian installations and important infrastructure. For half a year or so after the invasion more organised large-scale armed resistance took place until the fighters had to take refuge in the mountains. This resistance has in military terms been very effective, mainly because of a combination of strong public support and favourable geographical conditions for guerrilla warfare (The East Timor landscape is very rough and hilly, and has in addition a tropical climate which gives a jungle-like vegetation), but the political goals have not been possible to reach by violent means. The Indonesian response was a war against the population, and a barbarous bombardment of areas under *Fretilin* control. This massacre included grave human rights violations, and the deportation of hundreds of thousands of people into deportation camps. Even though over 200,000 people, that is every third East Timorese person, were killed by the Indonesians in the 1975-1995 period no party ever succeeded in getting even close to their political goals.

Fretilin and its supporters did however not only use violent means but nonviolent actions as well, often supported by the student movement (Pinto 2001). Demonstrations, and other nonviolent methods, were undertaken as soon as there was an opportunity, as for example when the Pope visited in 1990, or a Portuguese delegation in 1991. Indonesian forces did always forcefully suppressed such nonviolent moves, leading to events such as the so-called Santa Cruz massacre. Demonstrations were also undertaken in Jakarta, where also *Fretilin* supporters started a campaign where they sought refuge at foreign embassies. The now president, then *Fretilin* leader, Xanana Gusmao was the symbol head for such actions, especially after he was captured in 1992. However, it is in the East Timor case not possible to separate out ideologically nonviolent movements, something that is a result of the extreme and violent conditions in the area.

There are two specific individuals that have been fundamental for the success of the struggle, Bishop Carlos Belo and Jose Horta. Bishop Belo channelled the will of the Catholic East Timorese people for whom he worked as both a spiritual leader and symbol of peaceful resistance towards the Indonesian regime, a regime that he also frequently criticised. In fact,

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[17] *Fretilin* has a military wing called *Falintil*, but for the purpose of this analysis they will be seen as one organisation as they are interlinked, and not separated as in for example the North Ireland conflict. Further, here the term *Fretilin* will also include the National Council of Revolutionary Resistance (CRRN) and the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) which are all directly linked with, and created from, the *Fretilin* movement and the purpose and leadership is the same (For a more in-depth discussion see Niner 2001).

the East Timorese Roman Catholic heritage became fully integrated in the resistance against the regime (Kohen 2001). To fully understand his and the churches importance we need to remember that relatively few political activists and leaders persisted, since they were systematically and effectively arrested, exiled or simply killed. Jose Horta has since he fled three days before the Indonesian troops invaded in 1975 been in charge for the *Fretilin* external campaign, and he has further lead the international campaign for an independent East Timor (Niner 2001). He has attempted to make as well people as the decision makers around the world aware of the situation to get their help in doing something about it, by participating in seminars, giving lectures, and even talking to the European Parliament.

The Deli Legacy and the End of the Cold War (1991-1998)

After the end of the Cold War and the bipolar system, with the creation of an international society problematising non-traditional issues such as human rights, and subsistence rights (Donnelly 1994; Dunne & Wheeler 1999; Falk 1998), the struggle for independence started to make an impact. Parallel to this an international civil society was being formed which moved power away from the ruling elites to the people of the world, and the people of the world has shown a strong tendency to care about one another and not accept "politics", "communist threat", or "national interests" as an answer (Florini 2001; Keck & Sikkink 1998).

This fundamental change increased the power and impact of transnational movements such as the East Timor Action Network (Scheiner 2001), and the East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign (Ward 2000).[18] This is not to say that there was no support before the 1990s, but the supporters' often socialist ideas hindered their general effect and legitimacy during the Cold War. This problem is also related to a lack of media coverage until the 1990's, and Indonesia has been very efficient at suppressing information about what was happening in East Timor and there were no independent observers or journalist present in East Timor (O'Shaughnessy 2000). We shall here remember that at this time information moved much slower than today and that the current world order saw an independent East Timor as a part of the communist threat. As time passed more outside groups started working for the cause of East Timor, more information leaked out, and so forth and so on. The spiral increased in speed after the Pope John Paul II's visit in 1989, and especially after the highly publicised massacre at the Santa Cruz cemetery. Here the international pressure, largely the result of pressure from social movements, forced Indonesia to court martial ten of its soldiers for the

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[18] These movements normally have a national base, something that must be considered quite normal considering their pre-information technology heritage, but their approach is transnational.

massacre.

After 1991 the world could no longer say they did not know, a fact that was used by as well the international peace movement as human rights groups to pressure those with power to influence the Indonesian government. Four examples worth mentioning is the talk of Jose Horta in the European parliament 1992, the success in forcing Indonesia to accept international representatives during the Xanana Gusmao trial in 1993, and the political row in Australia when Lieutenant-General Herman Mantiri, who had been in charge of the Indonesian forces in East Timor and publicly defended the Santa Cruz massacre, was appointed Ambassador in Canberra in 1995. The milestone for the external social movements was when Bishop Carlos Belo and Jose Horta were awarded the Nobel Peace Prise in 1996 - now there was little risk that the East Timor struggle for independence could be taken of the international agenda.

The struggle continued and different movements worked together for the sake of East Timor. Pressure was put on national governments aiming at changing their policy. Groups worth mentioning here are for example the East Timor Action Network in USA, the East Timor Committee in Sweden and ETISC in Ireland, or cooperative organisations such as the International Federation for East Timor and Peace Brigades International who work on a more global level. Human Rights groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have also been important for the progression towards independence. All this efforts culminated in 1998 when a "window of opportunity" opened and there appeared to be possible to transcend the incompatibilities causing the conflict. After the fall of Suharto who was responsible for the invasion in the first place it had become possible to get rid of the Easy Timor problem that for a long time had made diplomatic life uncomfortable for Indonesia (Economist 1999a). This international work should not lead us to underestimate the importance of the local movements, here especially in the work of the *Fretilin* and the newly formed National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), lead by Xanana Gusmao (Araujo 2000). Without interaction and cooperation between the local and international level, in the end no working resolution would have been possible to find; the local ownership has been essential.

The Making of a State (1999-2002)
East Timor is since 20 May 2002 an independent state with a democratic system and government. But considering the circumstances around its independence it was only the start

of the difficult process of state building to move from being a fragile state to becoming a consolidated working democracy and stable state. The independent East Timor was completely dependent on foreign aid, has a not all to friendly neighbour, and had para-military groups on its western boarders This was less than optimal conditions in which to build and sustain a working administration, effective police force, high human rights standards, a just legal system, education, food and so on and so forth. The state building process This transformation process started as soon as violence ended in October 1999 after the UN intervention. There have of course been obstacles in the process, such as conflicts between local social movements and the United Nations about the division of labour and responsibilities (Nordquist 2002). Further, the referendum did also deepen the split between the pro-autonomy and the pro-independence lines. This division does however seem to be possible to overcome, both through local mechanisms focusing on reconciliation and with the help of track-two mediation efforts creating a forum for communication and reconciliation between the two lines.

The success of the East Timor state building process provided a continuing role for social movements. External social movements kept up pressure on national governments, intergovernmental organisations, NGO's and so forth to continue encourage/forcing them to give large amounts of aid to East Timor. The human rights movement had an important role to play to make sure that the East Timor human rights slate free from spots, spots that have a tendency to appear when former guerrilla movements moves into government. This is especially true after the scale of atrocities that has been seen in Timor which tends to trigger of feelings for-, and actions of revenge. Here for example the work of Amnesty International who closely monitored every move that is taken in the newly independent East Timor. Amnesty for example produced and published a report on how one is to build a new country based on human rights (Amnesty International 2000). Despite international help the main work had to be done locally. To achieve a local ownership and grassroot support for the development of the civil society and the democratic system is central for any successful state building process. Here the actions of social movement organisations such as *Fretilin*, their members, and supports can be identified as fundamental to avoid set-backs in the process. In East Timor, the people, the government, and the social movements are friends, not foes which has helped the process. There was also an unanimous support for an independent and democratic East Timor which created a internally positive environment.

7.3   Conclusion

The role and impact from social movements in the East Timor case does not falsify the theoretical predictions made**.** In fact, the case study has even given strong support for our theoretical model and conclusions. As one of the two conflicting parties were a principled local social movement no solution could have been reached without its involvement, and in this case this also applies to groups and movements around the *Fretilin* organisation. Non-principled social movements have however, generally speaking, not been involved in this conflict, and further, there have been no purely nonviolent groups active on the local level (with the possible exception of the church and parts of the student movement). But as we have seen and argued, nonviolent methods have still played a role. As we also have seen the same movements have been essential for the actual progression towards a resolution of the conflict. As predicted, transnational movements have been important for the possibility to move towards resolution.

Leadership-based organisations and individuals have played a core role in the process of permanent the settlement agreed upon, and in the recently stared development of a democratic state and working civil society. Though in this case they and their organisations have been of foremost importance all through the process, but this does not oppose the theoretical analysis as such. As we have seen, these and other movements, both local and external ones, are important for the continued development, or even further, for the *de facto* survival of East Timor as a working state. This is particularly true in regard to the possible dissatisfaction and problems that are likely to occur in the future for a struggling new state in a very poor location. Here the link between the grassroots and the local social movements (that for the time being also are the government), as well as between the local social movements and external ones, are essential for successful state building. In conclusion, our study of the East Timor case has not falsified the theoretical analysis. In fact it has even given strong support for our theoretical model and conclusions.

8.   Conclusion and beyond

8.1   Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to explore the possibility to, and benefits from, the creation of a third path for conflict resolution by bridging with, and integrating, social movement theory. At this point it will hopefully be quite clear that there exist a link between social movement theory and conflict resolution, on virtually all levels. In this section we will sum up these findings. We will first test the five assumptions set up, this since the possibility to give valid

answers to any of our research questions are conditioned on that none of the assumptions are falsified. Thereafter we will move to the research questions which will give the answers out purpose demands, to then explore what future research that needs to be done, before finally summing up.

The five assumptions set up has held. The first assumption was that "there exists a link between social movement theory and conflict resolution". After having in this paper tried to trace, and succeeded in tracing, both the SMT --> CRT --> OCRT --> CR, and the SMT --> SM -> CR links we can conclude that there exists a link between the two. Assumptions number two, that "social movement theory can be beneficial for the operationalisation of conflict resolution theory" has held. It has been shown that such a bridge would increase our understanding of all part of the operationalised model, as well as of the dynamics between them. The third and fourth assumptions, that "social movement theory can be beneficial for conflict resolution theory", and that "social movements can be beneficial in conflict resolution processes" have both received support. The final assumption, that "social movement theory can be beneficial for the implementation of conflict resolution theory" has not previously been specifically addressed in this paper. However, we have in our analysis traced and exposed the linkages between social movement theory and conflict resolution (SMT --> SM --> CR & SMT --> CRT --> OCRT --> CR), and also tested them empirically. Based on these analyses we can conclude that social movement theory can be beneficial for the practical implementation of conflict resolution, hence also this assumption holds. As all the underlying assumptions have held, we can now move on to our research questions.

The Theoretical Linkage

Question 1: What does the link between social movement theory and conflict resolution look like? (SMT -- CR).

The link between social movement theory and conflict resolution is not a simple one that can easily be described, something that should be obvious at this stage. The existence of the link is however beyond doubt, and we can conclude that there are in numerous links with different forms and level of importance for conflict resolution rather than one specific. We will here only mention some of the more fundamental linkages, this because they are more in depth described below when focusing on the benefits of integrating social movement theory.

Collective behaviour and the new social movement approach is linked to the for conflict

resolution fundamental development of a civil and democratic society. The later is also linked to the principled local social movements, movements that more often than not are one of the parties in intrastate conflicts, as well as to the safeguarding- and monitoring of the positive progression towards a durable peace. The resource mobilisation is linked to the essential participation, influence and safeguarding, as well as to the struggle towards, a permanent peace. It does also have a more instrumental linkage through the wide range of tools and instruments it is offering, these usable for conflict de-escalation and peace building. The political process approach is linked both through its non-principled social movements which often are involved in conflict resolution as supporters and/or logistic support, and through its more instrumental aspects related to the effective usage of the political opportunity structure.

Theoretical Development

Question 2: How can social movement theory benefit the development of conflict resolution theory? (SMT --> CRT)

Numerous benefits from an integration of theory have been identified. An integration of social movement theory can increase our understanding of the actions and reactions of the different actors, and following, enhance our knowledge of how and when conflicts arises. It will enhance our ability to understand both why actors decide to start conflicts, and under which conditions such actions are likely to be undertaken. This increased understanding will improve our ability to identify when there is a "ripe moment" possible to utilise for conflict resolution, and also, it will increase our ability to prevent and/or hinder the success-rate of spoilers.

On a less general level, we can from social movement theory learn more about the non-state conflicting party(ies), this since they often have movement features, or are social movements. We will be able to explain and understand why and when these arise, and what underlying needs and grievances that cause this to happen. Further, we will also better understand how these parties work, especially in regard to their internal dynamics. In line with this knowledge also follows a better understanding of how to create and direct social and cultural change, something which's importance for the development of applicable conflict resolution theories on intrastate conflicts cannot be underestimated. This, or similar, kinds of change are fundamental for conflicts that often are interest and identity focused. In conclusion, a bridging with and integration of social movement theory will with little doubt increase the strength of current conflict resolution theories.

Operationalisation of Conflict Resolution Theory

Question 3: How can social movement theory benefit the operationalisation of conflict resolution theory? (SMT --> OCRT)

Benefits from social movement theory can be identified in all parts of, and dynamics in, the model of operationalised conflict resolution theory. Our understanding of the creation and construction of a party, and the development of its identity and interests, will no doubt benefit from a bridging with social movement theory that has a stronger focus on such aspects. The same is the case in regard to the party's development over time, as well as its internal dynamics.

By increased understanding of the party, its creation, and development, we will be more able to resolve conflicts in which it is involved. This ability also benefits from our increased understanding of the incompatibilities themselves; we will better comprehend the underlying needs, grievances and real interests that create them. The possibility and ability to successfully form new shared institutions and to develop, create and/or find compatibilities will follow naturally with increased knowledge of the conflict formation, the conflicting parties, and the inter-party dynamics.

Concerning the either constructive or destructive actions shifting a conflict between escalation and de-escalation, the benefits from social movement theory is more limited. The increased understanding of the strategies and tactics of a social movement, as well as of how for a movement to approach and use the state and the political opportunity structure can possibly be helpful. But to argue that social movement theory can be of a more essential importance is something we have not found support for in this paper.

The Implementation of Conflict Resolution Theory

Question 4: How can social movement theory and social movements be beneficial for the implementation of conflict resolution theory (i.e. conflict resolution)? (SMT, SM --> CR)

When answering this question it should be remembered that the methodological framework has been developed to control for the linkage between social movement theory and its operationalisation in the form of social movements. Therefore no division needs necessarily to be made between the benefits on conflict resolution from social movement theory and social movements. The social movements used in this analysis are simply the

operationalisation of theory, and hence their impact can be directly traced back to social movement theory itself.

In the development of a civil society and a working democracy, social movements needs to be involved, and to involve them we also need to understand them. They are of both direct and indirect importance for the progression towards a permanent peace. This is true from the early stage where they are important to get the process started, to the later stages in the construction of a working society. They are also safeguards for what has been achieved. The importance of theory here relates to when and how to use social movements. One need to understand them and their dynamics, both per se and in combination with conflict resolution dynamics if to maximise the possibility of succeeding with conflict resolution. The theoretical knowledge is also important if to be able to chose the correct methods, and/or instruments for different tasks. Here it is also important to be aware of what the interests, goals and aims of the movements are, and how to use and/or change them.

To be able to at all succeed with the above process, one first needs to create conditions under which a resolution process can possibly start. As argued above, social movements can be a double-edged sword in a conflict resolution process. They can on the one hand spoil and destroy the whole resolution process, or they can be the factor that makes it possible. Few would argue against this, but there is still a lack of knowledge about how to best utilise the social movements. By integrating social movement theory we will better understand how to crate favourable conditions for resolution, how to avoid setbacks, and how we can use one movement to counter another, and so forth, and so on.

8.2 Future Research

This paper has only started to explore a possible third path for conflict resolution, and much more work needs to be done. This section will only note some of many areas where more research needs to be done. Firstly, it is essential to test the theoretical framework developed and its findings on more cases. Such a testing would increase the validity and reliability of the research. By testing with different cases we can better control for regional and cultural factors, as well for possible random case-specific features. This also demands that we chose a case from another region, but also replication on cases from the same region would be beneficial. This would however somewhat limit the possibility to generalise, but on the other hand it would increase the validity of, and possibility to make, generalisations on a regional level. It is also important to replicate the analysis with other approaches to conflict resolution

and conflict resolution theory, this both because it would increase the validity, but also since it would increase the range and number of beneficial tools and instruments identified. It has also the potential to be beneficial to use other theories on social movements and see how that affects the analysis. It would also be appropriate to further examine the possible problems related to the usage and applicability of theories developed for Western settings.

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